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Preface
The danger of subjective description is that it can color the content of
the described, leading to bias in the manner a subsequent reader will
be informed. There is thus a desire to achieve as much an objective
description as possible, to allow the reader enough latitude to interpret
on his own. This has been a silent idealism fueling the technology of
imagery.
However, it is a strange paradox that as technology presents us with
ever increasing power for the manufacture and circulation of imagery,
through photographic and now digital images, these formats of imagery
themselves tend increasingly to hold less semantic information. Atten-
tion to content has been sacrificed in the search for objectivity. This
is an undesirable stance. The first chapter, Digital Messages, argues
for the futility of the search for objective descriptions of images. The
describer must accept the subjectivity inherent in the task of provid-
ing a description of an image; he has thus henceforth dispensed with
any allusions of definitiveness or universality. He is finally allowed to
provide what appears to him the most appropriate description from
his vantage point. In other words, we have no choice but to entrust
him with deciding the contents. This then leads to the importance of
developing content-based representations.
Before we begin with the task of creating an example of content-
based representations, we should first look for the history of such rep-
resentations, not confining our domain to the particular field of digital
imagery. We must examine the paradigms upon which these repre-
sentations arose; we must examine the very field of representation, its
implications and any introspective reflections. This will provide insight
into problems we are likely to face, and be forewarned of the impli-
cations and limitations of our task. This discussion is covered in the
second chapter, Image Representations, of this paper.
After these two chapters, we are ready to discuss the specific rep-
resentation of digital image sequences that has been implemented in
concert with this paper. The method chosen is one whose content in-
cludes knowledge of cognitive objects in the image. The method is a
simple one, a slight variation on the traditional representation of digital
images (that of a rectangular image intensity array), with the addition
of encoding content implicitly within the look-up-table by rearranging
entries. All this is outlined in the third chapter on Methodology.
As will be demonstrated, an indirect but desired consequence of
this encoding is the forming of predicates, breaking the tight bonds of
the pixel and frame as fundamental units. This is a turn away from
the mounting division of imagery through pixelization in recent history
beginning with Mondriaan. This division and search for a fundamental
unit is a result of the desire to define images precisely to enable exact
communication. Predicating (grouping of pixels or yet other predi-
cates) forms higher order organization of images and maintains and
even magnifies the manipulability of digital images.
The first three chapters speak of writing images, and thereafter we
proceed with the issue of its subsequent reading. How is the infor-
mation that has been encoded accessed? Representing imagery with
higher orders of manipulability and organization presents new possibil-
ities for displaying such images. The ease in decoding and access of
the encoded content offered by the method implemented suggests an
interactive format for reading. The fourth chapter The Interactive
Movie, speaks about interacting with the moving image'.
imoving image and image sequence will be used interchangebly.
Interactive systems transform the nature of reading and writing
itself. The impact, meaning and consequences of interactivity are ex-
amined. The many pittfalls and problems, both computational and
sociological, are also examined to understand why they arise. Possible
solutions are suggested.
We end with Currents which will recapitulate certain main points,
and reevaluate what has been achieved, reexamine what the original
goals and intentions were. The implementation and its implications
are defended, and its shortcomings discussed and resolved.
To summarize, the purpose of the following discussions and inquiries
is not so much to lead to an ideal representation of moving imagery, but
to touch on some issues that might encourage us to further examine the
problems at hand. By partially removing ourselves from direct coding,
moving toward some more general questions about representations, we
begin to see parallels in related fields that may yield additional insights.
We desire to discover patterns of study, and based on these results, place
image coding in the context of ordering of information for the purpose
of deciphering knowledge.
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Chapter 1
Digital Messages
Digital Images
A digital image, in its conventional format (and we speak now not of
synthesized images, but of registrations1 of the visible world), like a
photograph, is a thing: it is an object. But through this object, the
digital image conveys meanings: it emits messages. The digital image
is coded with knowledge, explicitly through culture.
We shall attempt to extract the object from the nest of messages
that accompanies it and, by studying this object, examine any rem-
nant murmurs of messages that derive purely from the very format of
representation. We are looking for digital messages, knowledge that is
implicitly coded in digital images.
1Registration as a precise type of recording.
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1.1 Cultural Messages
A digital image has messages. Culture plays a role in producing these
messages.
Barthes[Barthes 77] extensively examines and speaks at length about
messages and meanings in images. Though his direct focus is photo-
graphic images, his ideas can be read more generally. We will take
the liberty to tailor and extend these ideas with the goal of informing
ourselves of the nature of digital imagery.
What are these cultural messages?
Documentation
A digital image is a document. A digital image, like any registered
image, or a record of any form, functions often as a document, existing
for the purpose of reading and re-reading, for the (re)examination and
study of the registered. In documenting, messages are formed.
In the creation of this image as document, there is, beside the
purely mechanical process of registration, the processes of emission and
reception[Barthes 85]. Through the very manner of the processes of
writing (emission) and reading (reception), messages are constructed.
The first of thiese messages is the literal message: it is the pure iden-
tification of the represented scene.
Reception
Outside of this first message (the literal message), a second message
emerges from the impact of the image. The second message emerges
as a function of reading, and readings differ widely according to the
context of an image's exhibition and according to its readers. The
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second message is transformed by the adjacency of other materials, by
the timing of its showcase, and by the beliefs and previous exposures
of its audience.
The message that is imparted depends on its reception.
Emission
This second message that is imparted also depends on its emission.
Its "maker", in the process of framing, in his choice of subject and
his treatment (lighting, photogeny etc.), and in his use of objects (props,
minor or major), forms a specific recording of the scene. The image
is, through these processes, coded with signs, and these significations,
producing connotations of the image, draw upon conventions of the
particular culture. The success and effectiveness of this second message
require that its readers maintain access to this codebook of knowledge,
this collection of conventions. In a particular culture, a bookcase may
signify intellectuallism, for example, or a recently extinguished candle
may signify the ephemeral, or lighting from below may signify unknown
horrors. The codebook is known.
Culture
We see then that the reception and emission of an image is a function of
sociology. This observation, in turn, forces the study of the structure of
these messages-the processes of their manufacture and consumption-
to be necessarily entwined with a study of social structure.
The study of images is a study of culture.
The study is an historical one as the message rests upon a set of
culturally accumulated signifiers; its signs and expressions are pregnant
with particular associations by virtue of the practices in a given society.
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The study of the image at this level is a study of these conventions
themselves, their origins, their impact and their nature.
1.2 Digital Image as Analog to Depicted
A digital image is also an object.
We have spoken thus far about connoted messages deriving from
culture. In this section, we wish to examine the digital image as an
object, outside of the image's emission and reception, to study its au-
tonomous structure, purged of sociology and its complexities, to be able
to examine the formal skeleton on which the object rests. We wish to
see how the foundations of the object form, guide, and limit the ob-
ject's secondary and tertiary meanings. What is left of the message if
we must not consider its reading within the cultural context?
1.2.1 Analog as Object
What is the image as an object?
A digital image as an object, in its conventional format, like a pho-
tograph, speaks of visual reality2, echoing it as a perfect "copy". It
is a map to a territory, the scene that is registered. And even if this
map, this image, is not visual reality itself, it is at least its perfect
analogue. Barthes[Barthes 85] calls it an analogon. It is the pure and
simple denotation of reality.
It is curious that the etymology of the word image, which links it
to the Latin imitari, from which imitation also derives. The Webster
dictionary defines image as
2 Visual reality as distinct from dimensional reality.
1.2. DIGITAL IMAGE AS ANALOG TO DEPICTED
image, n. Latin imitari to imitate. 1: a reproduction or
imitation of the form of a person or thing.
The analogon is an object. The analogon is an autonomous part of
the image. As an object, it is free and independent-it lives of itself. It
is indescribable, for, as like any description, it cannot be redescribed, for
the act or redescription transforms the object. The image as an object is
resistant to interpretation, resistant to interrogation, lest interrogation
disintegrates it, as a mummy decays when "interrogated."
1.2.2 Object in Construction
How is this analogon constructed?
The mechanical process of registration, by which a scene is recorded,
is a transfer, not a transformation; it cannot be called a transformation
in that no codes are produced to guide its subsequent reading. The
process can, however, be termed a transfer, in that the semblance is
transferred from the depicted scene to its depiction. In this transfer,
there is no need for codes. The digital image, in its mechanical form,
that is, the analogon, is a pure correspondence to the reality it records.
It is true that, as in any imaging system, artifacts are undoubtedly
introduced-spatial and intensity resolution, for example. But, aside
from this, within these limitations, the analogon is a direct mapping.
The physical process of registration in and of itself imparts no codes
to the registered image.
The analogon is international; it is non-denominational.
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1.3 Significations of the Digital Image
1.3.1 Mythical Non-signification of the Object
We have separated the analogon of the digital image from significations
deriving from culture. Is this object then objective, clear of any sig-
nifications? It is, at first glance, seemingly so. Noting that all second
messages are cultural, and that such messages could not exist without
a book of codes, then it follows that since the analogon has no book,
it is then pure and void of references to codes: the analogon remains,
as it was when constructed, a pure denotation. This section aims to
inspect this situation.
These questions are new. They are brought about by technology
which has presented the very possibility of the analogon. To begin this
inspection, we start with the study of the production of images before
and after the advent of technology that has brought about the analogon.
1.3.2 Signifying before Technology
In the reproductive disciplines before photography, before the rapid ad-
vent of technology, in the mimetic arts such as drawing or painting, not
every visual detail was "copied", and often very little. Thus these arts
were, compared with photography, much less denotative of the depicted
scene. Nevertheless they did not cease to impart strong messages.
Imperfections offer Second Messages
These representations created semblances of the analogon. The image
as object, the analogon-semblance contained "mistakes", visual inaccu-
racies. Because of these mistakes, the image as object, in the function
of denoting the depicted scene, cannot perform without distraction.
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These mistakes located the difference between the seen and the said,
and these "locations" are exactly the "space" for connotations, for sig-
nifications, for the coding of second messages. The lack of exactness of
these representations resulted in the corruption of denotation: conno-
tations and denotations were intertwined.
Messages were formed through the very style of reproduction. Rep-
resentation, the image as object, incorporated connotations. The image
as object was cultural.
In the recording of the depicted scene onto the object as represen-
tation, regulated transformations (perspective for example, or expres-
sionist strokes), produced connoted messages, using references that are
common in the community and generally known by the intended read-
ers. The image is read intact. Outside of this community, however,
where the appropriate book of codes is absent, the connoted messages
are lost.
Thus, the physical processes before the advent of technology inher-
ently produced codes. These codes mapped the image to the repre-
sented, and bridged the reader with the image.
Imperfections Insist on Second Messages
The act of rendering reflected the general disposition of the mind. A
reproduction was thus more than a pure denotation of the depicted
scene itself; it included what the scene appeared to be to the depictor's
senses. Aristotle notes that the renderer often imitated things not as
they are, but as they ought to be. These arts are then less representation
of outer reality than they are of subjective expressions.
Even in the event of a meticulous rendering, imitating the scene in
an "objective" fashion with the conscious goal of objectivity, however
successful it is, the production of messages persists.
There was a signature of objectivity. There is connoted objectivity.
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Before technology, all representations of images were attached to
signifiers. There are signifiers outside of those produced by the pro-
cesses of reception and emission. The representation itself (the image
as object), signifies.
Before technology, representations (images as objects) signified.
1.3.3 Signifying after Technology
Then came technology. Photography brought with it the era of produc-
tion: copies of descriptions are easily manufactured. This is followed
by digital images, with the era of process: copies are not only produced
but the copies were no longer distinct. All copies are identical. There
is no longer an original.
Perfection is Cultural
Technology offers us a new order of mimetic representations. Photogra-
phy, followed by digital imagery, presents us with so perfect an analog of
the depicted, the analogon, that it requires no code. The only "knowl-
edge" that is needed to read such images is the perceptual. Apparently
there are no cultural messages, no second messages.
We take a bolder step presently in pursuing a further analysis of the
the analogon. It is claimed here that the apparent is misleading and
that, outside of the aforesaid cultural messages deriving from emis-
sion and reception, there are indeed second messages deriving from the
very manner of construction of the representation, messages which are
therefore embedded into the analogon itself.
In the next section, we will excavate these connoted messages from
the analogon, unearthing the connotations of technology.
1.4. CONNOTATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY
1.4 Connotations of Technology
1.4.1 The Impossibility of the Non-Connotative
Why do we believe that the analogon is purely denotative, that it is an
objective representation of reality?
The human "maker" of a digital image has no intention of making
the image not objective. On the contrary, it is often one of his conscious
goals to make it objective. The maker detaches himself from the process
of making, creating the machinery that takes over the function of image
creation. This registering machinery does not "think", does not know
the codes of culture. It is incapable of connoting and is thus, supposedly
within the reach of objectivity.
But this "objectivity" risks being mythical for, although the "maker"
is removed from the process of connoting, the technology that has
brought it about is cultural. The human, or the society that he is part
of, is ultimately the maker of the image. Hidden within the process of
registering-this process of transcribing reality-are cultural messages.
It is interesting to examine what these unintended cultural messages
are, for in in doing so, we may perhaps might bring to the surface hints
of our belief system.
Objectivity cannot be achieved. Pure denotation is impossible.
1.4.2 Phobia of the Incomplete, Scorn for the In-
exact
Why do we want to achieve objectivity? Why do we believe in, and
have a desire for, objective descriptions? Forming some understanding
of these questions might help us discover these claimed "connotations
of technology" and to put them into perspective.
CHAPTER 1. DIGITAL MESSAGES
It is sanctified that every individual reads for himself. This mythical
demand is held supreme. To grant the possibility of this, the writing
must be exact, it must be complete, free of connotations, for any con-
notation leads the reader-we must not read for others, lest we mislead
them. Hence grows the suspicion and phobia for subjective descrip-
tions.
But, given that we have the limitation of being finite with our de-
scriptions, it is not possible to have a complete description for any
general image, only if it was because that we do not know to what
granularity to choose to describe, and the innumerable types of infor-
mation the reader might request. A complete and exact description is
impossible.
Despite obvious problems, the search for an objective description
continued within its known limitations. What was sought after was a
description that was precise enough in itself, so that a re-description
would result in an exact copy of the first description. The image would
then transcend its manifestation as an object. The image returns to
become a concept. Piet Mondriaan {Mondriaan 20] was amongst the
first to attempt to formulate a formal system, beginning to create exact
definitions for spatial and color units-a pixelization of images. Digital
images of today achieve many of these desired properties. Exact copies
can be made because the description of the "original" is completely
precise, enabling complete transmission of an image across a commu-
nication channel, on the other end of which an identical image can be
reconstructed. This surreal achievement is applauded.
Pixelization of images has its achievements, but it has not achieved
objectivity.
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1.4.3 Intensity is the Message, Adjacency is the
Order
Finally, if digital images are subjective, what then are some examples
of their embedded connotations of technology?
There is always an order that we impose on our interaction with the
natural world so as to enable us to have a reference with which to make
possible controlled perception and enable us to accumulate knowledge.
This is the episteme of a culture: a criteria for ordering.
In the digital image, as well as in the photograph, there is a direct
correspondence in the spatial dimension, and a direct proportionality in
intensity, between the image and the represented scene. In this instance
then, the criteria, which we have no reason to believe are not subjective,
upon which the description is sown, number two-these being, firstly,
locality and adjacency and, secondly, light intensity.
The former, that of locality and adjacency, might be precariously
defended as following natural laws and relationships which exist free
from distortion by personal affect. Criteria that use these properties,
that seemingly exist independently of mind, can perhaps be justifibly
proclaimed as objective.3 After all, do not natural interactions between
matter, interactions such as gravity, seem localized and to be a function
of the euclidean4 , or the adjacent in any geometric space?
Likewise, the latter criteria, that of light intensity, may too be ar-
gued and propped up. But these arguments are not strong enough to
make us not conclude that embedded within the analogon are precisely
these two cultural epistemes, these criteria for ordering, for knowing.
The acceptance of the image plane as a good representation of the vi-
sual element is undoubtedly, as will be further demonstrated in the
next chapter, cultural.
3 This topic will be dealt with in detail in a later chapter.
4The distance between points in Euclidean geometry.
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The digital image is not hermetic to the epistemes of society. The
analogon reflects these epistemes. The analogon contains connotations
of the beliefs of society, specifically of society's technology.
1.5 Technology of Images
1.5.1 Limitations of Technology
The analogon is not purely denotative; the image as object implicitly
reflects cultural epistemes.
We have observed the futility of objective descriptions of digital
imagery: all representations contain some decided information. Despite
all attempts at objectivity, some criteria has been chosen, consciously
or otherwise, with which information is described. Certain types of
information are included in the description.
In realizing this futility of the search for objectivity, we salvage what
we can, for not all is in despair; whether the ideal of objectivity was
actually so desirable had not even been discussed. At this point, in
accepting the inherent subjectivity in the task of describing images, it
is important to decide what the most guides and motivations are. We
must set ourselves to define new goals.
One major focus should be on the consideration of exactly what
types of information we wish to encode in our "subjective" descriptions.
Not believing in the sanctity of intensity-adjacency descriptions, frees
us to rethink other appropriate representations of images. We must
entrust the describer with deciding the contents of the representation.
The idea of representations that are content-based becomes primary.
And these contents is what the describer says the image contains.
In the run for objectivity, technology of image representations had
progressed to bring various techniques of desirable and undesirable
1.5. TECHNOLOGY OF IMAGES
qualities and capabilities. We can now re-examine these qualities and
take advantage of the strengths of technology for the fulfillment of new
goals. What is the range and type of information that is available,
obtainable, codable, and what are the techniques and implications of
such developments?
Within the limitations of technology, what can it offer us?
1.5.2 Offerings of Technology
It is a strange paradox, that while technology has enabled the increase
the circulation of information (it is easier to make copies of the photo-
graph analogon than it is of paintings), the content of the photograph
analogon compared to, say, painting, is correspondingly diminished. At-
tention to content has been sacrificed in the search for objectivity. This
is an undesirable situation and it need not be for there is no inherent
reasons why technology would bring methods that void content.
On the contrary, there is a gamut of properties of digital imagery
that can be harnessed to good effect. In the tradition of Cubism and
Perspective [Panofsky], we can consider the analogon of the digital image
to be an array of symbols upon which we can perform transformations.
The analogon is ultimately manipulable. Any particular section of the
analogon, a unit of data (and there are a large range of definitions of
unit), can be addressed. The digital image has a virtual presence: it
is manifested in the visual but it exists really in the space of memory
banks and mathematical matrices. This space lends itself operational
to the realms of combinatory algebra, and transformable to all systems
of equivalence. Thus the digital image, aside from its manifested visual,
is a meta-image in the sense that it can be trivially manifested in many
forms. Its manipulability, and its consequent ductility, allows much of
any transformations to be implementable. Arbitrary transformations
on the image can be performed, that set the image into formats that
bring out information otherwise obscured. Within these innumerable
formats, content can either be hidden and incorporated, or better yet,
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formats can be defined with content as its base.
All digital data (image, sound, etc.) have a common fundamental
unit of bit, and thus begin to blur the distinctions between different
media, making multi-media not a fancy but almost the default. Con-
version from one medium to another, transcoding, from text to sound
for example, becomes unnecessary. Text and sound become derivable
from the same data. Text and sound are but different readings of the
same data. "Content" remains constant.
Epilogue, and Preamble to next chapter
Epilogue
In reading, different readers deduce different knowledge and have diver-
gent intentions. In writing, as in representing, the author intends that
the material is read more than once-either by himself or by other par-
ties to whom he imparts a message. That a writing cannot avoid being
but one specific interpretation, imply that any representation cannot
meet the desires and demands of all its readers. Accepting that there
is no hermeneutical neutrality in any representation, suggests that the
format of representations should not linger on attempts to be universal,
but that it should convey its own particular message clearly. The only
way the reader is capable of achieving his own intentions is that he
subscribes to many multiple particular descriptions.
Preamble to next chapter
To focus on content-based representations of imagery, we must begin
by putting the inquiry into the context of representations in general.
We can then find precedents of representations of this type, not having
to confine ourselves to examples within the field of imagery. While
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examining these precedents, we must closely consider the very field of
representation, its reflections and implications. With this behind us,
we can perhaps have better insights into the problems we are likely to
face, and be forewarned of the limitations and harvests of our tasks.
The next chapter begins with this discussion of image representations.
28 CHAPTER 1. DIGITAL MESSAGES
Chapter 2
Image Representations
In the last chapter, Digital Messages, we discussed the fall of a cul-
tural paradigm, that of objectivity. The quest for objectivity is no
longer pursued in any field, be it quantum theory or post-modernist ar-
chitecture. This quest is replaced by a new percept-that of subjective
knowledge with a fabric of interconnecting relationships. We are inter-
ested, here, in the sorts of representations that arise from this percept.
What sorts of representations can express and promote the interests of
this new manner?
It is the intentions of this paper to examine a representation that
might incorporate and serve this new thought. It is in the next chapter,
Methodology, that we demonstrate the implementation of a content-
based representation where we formulate content-units which are linked
by context-units.
So as to enable the next chapter to be read in the proper frame-
work, our purpose here, in this chapter, is two-pronged. In the first
section, we will examine how representation is inextricably linked with
knowledge; how the types of representation reflect cultural beliefs, de-
sires and understanding. The second section will take us through a
focussed survey of digital image representations that are of relevance
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to our case, both in the sense of historical and conceptual develop-
ments. In this survey, we will observe that the form of digital image
representations has headed toward a structuralist mode (that of struc-
tures and establishment of relationships between different hierarchical
units of data), and onto a post-structuralist stance (that of multiplicity
and inter- (cross)relationships).
2.1 Knowledge and representation
Nietzsche: "There are no facts, only interpretations."
Knowledge and representation are interwoven. The way we under-
stand things determines how we describe them. The way we describe
things determines how we will further understand them.
2.1.1 Representing
Representation is the technique by which notes are made and from
which ideas are formed. In divergent fields of inquiry, issues of repre-
sentation are of supreme importance, for they often determine the very
success or failure of a quest. We note that the term representation has
seemingly specific meanings in different fields. These meanings, at first
glance, seem unrelated.
As Blatt [Blatt 84] notes about representing:
"in painting it refers to technical procedures for recreating a
segment of nature on a 2-D surface, in psychological theory
the term refers to a construction of a sense, image, or con-
ception of a segment of nature in one's mind, and in science
the term refers to a model of a physical structure".
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Without ignoring conventions peculiar to specific fields, represen-
tation refers to a process of symbol construction[Blatt 84], and in this
sense the term is equivalent across fields, despite practical differences
in the media in which symbol construction occurs.
Representation is a manifestation of the paradigms of inquiry, which
in effect determines the very kinds of possible knowledge. It is not
suprising that representations across different fields are structurally
similar in a particular culture, as they express, are limited by and in
turn limit, the culture's general conceptual schemes for the interpreta-
tion of the universe. Foucault[Foucault 74] calls these schemes cultural
epistemes.
2.1.2 Classifications
Classifications reflect how we understand and order things.
Representation begins with classifying. A primary goal of repre-
sentation, and of human knowledge in general, is to establish some
ordering of information, from which we can "spin a web of understand-
ing". This science of ordering is seen as a matter of sorting, dividing
and enveloping-giving birth to schemes of classification. In this act of
classifying, we delimit the Same to distinguish it from the Other, and
thus begin to "tame the wild profusion of existing things" [Foucault 74],
managing (and henceforth manipulating) the otherwise incomprehen-
sible splattering of things and events.
We cannot represent without knowlege, and there is no knowledge
without classification.
Borges[Borges 57] notes that a certain Chinese encyclopedia reports
that animals are divided into
1. belonging to Emperor
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2. embalmed
3. tame
4. sucking pigs
5. sirens
6. fabulous
7. stray dogs
8. included in the present classification
9. frenzied
10. innumerable
11. drawn with a very fine camel-hair brush
12. et cetera
13. having just broken the water pitcher
14. that from a long way off look like flies
Foucault says of this:
In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we appre-
hend in one great leap, ... is the limitation of our own [sys-
tem of thought], the stark impossibility of thinking that.
... Each of these strange categories can be assigned a pre-
cise meaning and a demonstrable content; some of them do
certainly involve fantastic entities-fabulous animals and
sirens-but, precisely because it puts them into categories
of their own, the Chinese encyclopaedia localizes their power
of contagion; it distinguishes carefully between the very real
animals (those that are frenzied or have just broken the wa-
ter pitcher) and those that reside solely in the realm of
imagination.
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Classifications echo the criteria with which ordering is performed.
Classifications yield signifiers with the smallest units of classes as the
signified. With the assembly of these signifiers, higher classes are gener-
ated. To illustrate, we see that a dog is an instance of a (furry)-(animal).
Representation begins with classifying; it begins with the construc-
tion of symbols. Representation reflects knowledge.
2.1.3 Cultural Codes
The choices of representation reflect the desires and beliefs of culture.
It has been argued that classifications and representations reflect the
Weltanschauung of their period or culture. Panofsky [Panofsky] does
this in his discussion of the representation of space in art as a symbolic
form. He shows that a culture's conception of nature is expressed in its
rendition of objects and space. Italian Renaissance's linear perspective,
he demonstrates, echoes their view of space as infinite, homogenous and
isotropic.
The forms of representation, then, reflect a culture's understanding
and conception of its environment. A representation echoes the criteria
for ordering, the desire and beliefs, of the society that created it. In
the last chapter, we saw that in the traditional representation of digital
images (a 2-D array of pixels) was the desire for objectivity, and that
intensity and adjacency were the criteria for ordering.
2.1.4 Embedded Knowledge
As much as representations reflect culture, it also reflect the individual's
beliefs, desires, inspirations and understanding. We have only to look
into the works of artists, an impressive body of empirical evidence, to
convince ourselves. Painting codes knowledge; it reflects the painter's
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knowledge of the subject, further reflecting his mental representation
of reality.
The painter paints his knowledge.
Unintentional Coding
The encoding of knowledge is often done without the painter's (or, more
generally, the author's) full intention, though commonly it is still too
obvious for the reader to ignore.
In a letter Van Gogh [Gogh 67] wrote to Theo, circa mid-October
1888, he describes (codes, here in text) a painting of his bedroom, a
place to "rest the head or rather the imagination".
... This time it's simply my bedroom, only color must do
the job here... the walls pale lilac, the floor of a broken and
faded red, the chairs and the bed chrome yellow, the pillows
and the linen lemon-green and very pale, the cover blood-
red, the washstand orange, the basin blue, the window green
Van Gogh, in this painting, codes his painting with color, having
each color represent a particular cognitive object. He paints not what
he sees, but what he knows and believes. True, Van Gogh is a genius,
but it is hard for anyone not to be a genius in this respect-we have
learned such a great natural power of cognition. The fact that there
are words like "chair" and "window" reflects our mental representations
of the world-we know such entities. Plato argues eloquently, in the
Republic, and this is stronger than we intend to note, that in fact, the
world is but a instance, and often a pure imitation, of the ideal world
that is in the mind.
It is noteworthy that although Vincent lived alone, everything was
painted in pairs, a pair of chairs, a pair of pillows etc. Although he
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Figure 2.1: the bedroom, oil, arles, 1888
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does not speak of it, it more than probably reflects his mind, exposing
the intensity of his need for a companion. In fact, he did earlier write
about other possible inclusions in the paintiig, ". . there will be three
subjects. Perhaps a nude woman, I have not decided, perhaps a cradle
with a child; I do not know, but I shall take my time."
Intentional Coding
On other occasions, it is the author's explicit intent, sometimes even
to the extent that it is the very philosophy of a school of thought, to
explicitly include visual codes, to express its desires and beliefs.
The Cubists experimented with the idea of explicitly rendering not
only what one saw but to also incorporate, within the rendering, what
one knew of the depicted scene. In many paintings, an object is ren-
dered, within a local canvas surface, from multiple points of views and
moments of time.
Moholy-Nagy[Moholy-Nagy 65] writes:
... After the Cezanne's subtle attempts to create a new
way of painting which would express such a vision, the
avalanching power of the cubists brought forth a more ac-
curate method. They showed the object, its elevation, plan
and section on the flat canvas-as it would be seen from
many viewpoints, in motion, revolving before the eyes of
the spectator... [the] important feature [is the] visual force
and emotional wealth of relationships, the constructive po-
tential of the visual fundamentals.
The Cubists explicitly voiced that representation is inextricably
linked with knowledge. The Surrealists tried to suspend knowledge
by dismembering representation.
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Knowledge is implicitly coded into representations. These "contents"
reflect the desires and beliefs of a given culture. The study of how things
are represented often gives us insights to how things are understood,
and what is deemed important to a particular individual or society.
The study of this coding is a basis for the study of culture. That
representation inherently encodes interpretation, and that there is no
hermeneutical neutrality in any representation is generally accepted.
In the next section we begin a survey of different levels and abstrac-
tions of representations of digital imagery.
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2.2 2-D Surface for Image Representa-
tion
2.2.1 Cultural Image-Plane
In the formation of visual representation on the image-plane, the phys-
ical world is collapsed from its three-dimensional reality to its two-
dimensional projection on a surface. If this "reduced" object(the image-
plane) is to be re-read as construing the physical world, a reverse trans-
lation must be performed without the benefit of lost depth information.
It is the absence of this depth information that causes image distortion
as we view the image surface from different angles. In fact, there is
but one view-angle from which the image-plane representation appears
"correct". Then, to generally interpret this image plane correctly, which
we seem to manage to do, we must "reconstruct" the represented from
the plane-image and its visual distortions, appropriating our acquired
perceptual experiences.1
2.2.2 In the Defense of a Surface
What are the qualities of an image plane that has made it such a
successful and commonplace representation of the physical world?
In the earliest times, representation took the form of sculpture, a
clumsy method, perceptually difficult to implement. Then came paint-
ing. The emergence of painting is not difficult to understand: people
painted because they had walls! Simple as that.
Painting as representation of scenery met with success, and this lay
'It is possible that the human visual system has the innate capability to cor-
rectly interpret these planar images, and that this capability is triggered through
experience. It is of interest to note that children begin to recognize such images
only at age four.
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largely in the fact that, because the representation is removed from the
complete mapping of the represented, it acquired the strengths of the
symbolic (as another largely successful representation, that of natural
languages, is too) and thus manipulable, promoting deeper probing in
the study of space; this is demonstrated in the succession of develop-
ment of linear perspective in the Renaissance through Cubism and its
further contortions at the present time.
It is not entirely surprizing that sculpture met with sudden death
in the sixteenth century. Leonardo, writing in his Treatise on Paint-
ing [Leonardo 56], promoted painting, proclaiming it as supreme. He
writes:
If sculpture is lighted from below, it will seem monstrous
and strange, but this does not happen with painting which
carries all its elements within itself.... Applying myself no
less to sculpture than to painting, and practicing both in the
same degree, it seems to me with little change of bias I can
judge which demands more of the mind, and which presents
greater difficulty and is more perfect than the other.
Two-dimensional image-plane representation, in addition, is easy to
implement and offers a large saving in bandwidth. This reduction in
bandwidth allows the description of images to be produced either in
reduced time or in higher fidelity. Together, these factors contribute to
the success of this sort of representation.
However, discarding the third-dimension has its disadvantages as
well. This discarded dimension could have been used to simplify var-
ious image-processing and tasks of understanding. Without it, large
amounts of computation must be performed to extract otherwise seem-
ingly obvious information. An example of such information is the con-
tours of objects, which would have been a great help in the segmentation
of plane images.
At this point, we would like to note that the following chapter,
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on Methodology, limits itself solely with cognitive associations of im-
age surface areas of traditional image representations, avoiding three-
dimensional models 2 and also sidestepping issues of three-dimensional
reconstruction. Within such methods, as we just mentioned, are prob-
lems of segmentation computation. These issues will be skirted. The
limitations are acknowledged.
However, we still allow ourselves to indulge, for it is our interest not
to study the represented (the depicted scene) directly but to study it
through its representor. Examining the vocabulary of a "limited" (less
denotative) representation often gives more insights to relationships
between thought processes and depictions of reality.
2.3 Abstract Surface for Image Repre-
sentation
2.3.1 Memory Space for Intensities
The digital image is mapped to memory space.
Consider a monochromatic image. Using Cartesian coordinates, we
represent intensity at point (x, y) by B(x, y). We choose now a finite set
of points (x, y) for representation, the brightness of each point numeri-
cally represented by a finite number of bits i.e. quantized (for example,
using 8 bits per point, we can specify 256(= 28) different intensity lev-
els). This procedure is called Pulse Coded Modulation (PCM). The set
of sampling points (x, y) is often a rectangular array, and we call the
samples pixels. With the display of the pixels on the screen, we obtain
a visual impression of the image.
One displays the pixels on the screen for the purpose of presentation.
2The problems mentioned might be transcended in the technology and art of
holography
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The "real image" lives in the abstract space of memory banks and
registers. This is the classic and default convention of digital imagery.
2.3.2 Memory Space for 21-D Information
Other entities can be mapped to memory space.
This memory space for representation need not register image in-
tensities alone. Bove[Bove 87] used the space to register depth as well.
For every position (x, y) in the image array, the albedo(intensity)
rho and range data z is available. The aim is to code this information
into the 2-D array of memory.
To begin, range data z are used to derive surface normals by differ-
entiation. The slope of the surface in the x direction is called p, and the
y slope is called q. By exploiting statistical coherence between p, q and
rho, a visually reasonable 8-bit image can be obtained that includes all
this data. The vector (p, q, rho) is quantized to find 256 representative
vectors. The 8-bit image then references a 8-to-24 look-up-table whose
"redness" codes p, "greenness" codes q and "blueness" codes rho.
This representation is based on "content" which is, instead of inten-
sity to a fidelity of 256 values, (p, q and rho) with a combined fidelity
of 256 values. This representation provides certain manipulability not
otherwise possible. An example of this is the instant re-imaging given
a new different light source. This is demonstrated here.
Assuming that light comes from infinity, the reflectance(and result-
ing intensity) of each point of the image-plane is simply
R(x, y) = p n(x, y) -
where I is the light normal vector, and n is the surface normal
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derivable from p and q by
(p, q,1)
v/1 + p2 + q2
Since there are only 256 distinct values of pi, the resulting image
can be produced by just 256 multiplications.
2.3.3 The Frequency Space
An image can also be represented in frequency space.
But even in impressionistic descriptions, pixel intensity is definitely
not the only property of concern. In particular, in certain analysis like
edge detection, the rate of change of intensity from neighboring pixels
is more useful. We note that the rate of change of intensity is within the
domain of frequency descriptions. Thus, to enable ease of computation
of edge detection, it is best to represent an image in frequency space.
To transform a set of data-points to its frequency-domain represen-
tation, we use the mathematics of the Fourier transform.
Suppose we have the image B(x, y) with rectangular boundary i.e.
0 < x < X and 0 < y Y
Then we can describe the image completely as a sum of an infi-
nite set of frequency components 4mn, with weighting coefficients Cmn.
[Netraveli 88]
0w 00
B(x,y)= E E Cmnomn(X,Y)
m=-oo n=-oo
where mn (x, y) = exp 27r /1(" + "y
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The coefficients can be shown to be:
Cmn = j B(x, y)q$mn(x, y) dxdyJO JO
(' denotes complex conjugate)
This set of coefficients forms the Fourier transform of the image, a
representation in frequency space. It is a representation that makes fre-
quency information explicit, and allows frequency related information
to be easily retrievable. For example, it is trivial to deduce whether
the image has large flat areas (equivalently, large low frequency co-
efficients), or if it is populated with fine detail (large high frequency
coefficients). However, the spatial locations of these characteristics are
not easily computable. In the frequency domain, images lose all spatial
coherence in exchange for a gain in frequency coherence.
The frequency space can be used to represent images.
A problem with frequency space image representation is that it
loses its spatial coherence. Visual cognitive cues are absent. Adel-
son [Adelson 84], develops an elegant representation that contains both
frequency and intensity information. His representation, that he calls
Laplacian pyramids, begins to break from the plane-image format into
a multi-layered structure. His respresentation consists of a set of a
pyramid of successively smaller images, with each image spatially co-
herent and containing a particular range of freuquency information. As
in turns out, that a lot of simple cognitive processing that are compu-
tationally difficult in other image representations, are solved easily in
this format. It is a more sophisticated reprensation and appears to be
appropriate for purposes of image processing.
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2.4 N-Dimensional Space for Image Rep-
resentation
2.4.1 From Pixels to Predicates
The representation of imagery on a surface has its curses. It is perceived
and manipulated as an object, an analogon, and such a perception blinds
us from the fact that imagery is bound to cognition. Relationships
within an image could not then be dealt with properly. The remedy to
this problem is to abandon the analogon for a representations that are
abstract and live in "cognitive-space", in n-dimensions.
We examine such ideas by making a quick ride through the motiva-
tions of digital imagery in its short history.
Pixels Found: Transferable
The desire for exact descriptions began with Mondriaan. His de-composition
of images down to the use of rectangular figure blocks and of specific
"primary" colors was, as can be argued, the beginning of the pixeliza-
tion of imagery. This pixelization was a conceptual breakthrough and
met, at least in retrospect, with great success. The process of pix-
elization was a desirable move as it lead to image representations that
completely and exactly described images in a finite and small number
of signifiers. These signifiers signified defined classes of entities, and the
list of signifiers and their signifieds are known. This situation is anal-
ogous to quantized entry values of digital images and their referenced
look-up-table.
Through the very finiteness of this type of representation, an image
became transferable; an image could be transmitted in the sense that
exact copies of it can be made and distributed. This has its lure.
Through this development emerges the idea of a fundamental unit in
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images. In digital imagery, this unit has taken the form of the pixel.
A digital image is the sum of an array of pixels. The pixel is pure.
Pixels Reformed: Manipulable
At the same time, another aim in imaging was manipulability, with its
beginnings in Renaissance Perspective and in Cubism. Only if manipu-
lation were done on cognitive units would the results make any coherent
visual sense. Thus it would be most appropriate to find representations
that allow cognitive units to be readily represented. To represent cog-
nitive units, we must code relationships between different parts of the
image, for it is these relationships that delineate cognitive units in the
image plane. Relationships are the key.
Predicating achieves this kind of representation. A predicate de-
scribes both the properties of the a local object(the pixel, for example)
and well as its relationships with other objects, adjacent or otherwise.
A predicate is, recursively, a grouping of pixels (or of other predicates)
and the relationships between members of the group. The lowest "pred-
icate" is the pixel and its properties.
The image-as-predicates allows coherence manipulations to be per-
formed with much greater ease. A predicate, as a unit, can be trans-
formed; relationships between predicates are trivially modified.
Predicates then replace pixels as i fundamental units or, more pre-
cisely, fundamental conceptual building blocks. Grouping of pixels is
used here as a tool to signify that the relationships between pixels
within the grouping hold more strongly than among others. A predi-
cate could then be set to correspond to a cognitive object. Predicating
offers a formal system that holds the issues of relationships central.
The image is a conglomeration of predicates. The pixel is united.
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Figure 2.2: Predicates in Images
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Pixels Lost: Relationships
It can be argued that the traditional representation of the array of pixels
can also be read as predicates with the adjacencies as their relation-
ships. It is even true that adjacencies in the image array are significant
relationships, since adjacent pixels are, very often, constituents of the
same cognitive entity.
However, adjacencies do not always necessarily indicate relevant
relationships. The adjacent pixel often belongs to another cognitive
entity. Adjacencies are also not sufficient; the same entity often en-
compass pixels that are not adjacent. Furthermore, compounded and
higher-order relationships cannot be indicated in pixel array represen-
tations.
The pixel stands alone.
Pixels Regained: Knowledge
Do the individual pixels know they constitute a dog?
What use is a pixel by itself? It might as well be senseless, if it does
not know that it belongs to some higher order. What use is a object if
it does not belong to a larger order of things. An object out of context
is not an object of meaning.
On the other hand, a pixel that knows what it is a part of, knows
of other pixels. Knowledge spreads like wild fire. A representation
that offers symmetrical readings (predicates know their constituents,
and their constituents know what they belong to) would offer much
strength and integrity to images; such a representation has a larger
sense of completeness. Pixels gain character.
The representation with predicates makes exactly such dreams pos-
sible. Predicates are good. In coding a higher predicate of dog-tree,
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referring to the tree may guide us find the dog. And our dog knows that
he is part of dog-tree.
Predicates add sense to otherwise nameless pixels.
There are examples of such coding in nature. A prime example is
the DNA as the fundamental unit of living things. This unit of the DNA
contains all the information of the organism that it is part of. It knows
what it belongs to.
The pixel knows.
John Cage:
Life without structure is unknown.
Structure without life has no meaning.
2.5 Implicit Coding of Information
Another aspect of the implementation in the next chapter is implicit
coding. We shall spend a few words here to speak about two simple
precedents.
2.5.1 Explicit Information in Implicit Coding
A representation is a system for making explicit certain sorts of infor-
mation or entities.
To formally complete a representation so as to enable its use and
subsequent reading, it must be accompanied by a specification of how
2.5. IMPLICIT CODING OF INFORMATION
the system implements it. In other words, when we speak of represen-
tation, we speak of the representor and the rules that produce it from
the represented.
Let us look closer at how representations, through their rules of con-
struction, implicitly code certain formats of information thus making
it trivial to explicitly extract precisely these types of information.
2.5.2 Representations of Natural Numbers
As an example, we can compare the Arabic and the binary numeral
systems used to represent natural numbers. The Arabic representation
consists of a string of symbols drawn from the set (0, 1, 2, 3,4,5, 6, 7, 8, 9).
The method for constructing a particular integer n involves decompos-
ing n into a sum of multiples of the powers of ten, then placing these
multiples in a string, ordering them from the highest power on the left
to the smallest power on the right. Thus, the number twenty-five would
be decomposed to 2 x 101 +5 x 100 , resulting in the string 25. The in-
formation that is most readily extracted from this representation (due,
in this case, exactly to how it is constructed), is the various powers of
ten of this number. The binary representation also consists of a string
of systems drawn now from the set (0,1), and the construction rule is
to decompose the particular integer n into a sum of powers of 2, or-
dering them in a fashion similar to the Arabic method. Twenty-five
would be decomposed to 1 x 24 + 1 x 23 + 0 x 22 + 0 x 21 + 1 x 20,
resulting in the string 11001. It would not be a trivial task to extract
the powers of 10 from this binary representation, though instead, the
number's decomposition into powers of 2 is made explicit.
This purpose of this above example, to reiterate, is to demonstrate
that the choice of representation affects directly the sort of informa-
tion that can most easily be extracted. We notice too that, for a given
representation, certain manipulations are favored. For example, mul-
tiplication by 2 in binary is trivial-just pad a zero onto the right.
By induction, some complex processes could be trivial if they can be
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broken down to a series of compounded trivial manipulations.
The choice of representation is crucial. It determines what can be
done with the represented.
2.5.3 Representations of Natural Scenery
The choice of different representation of visual material also helps to
ease the extraction of desired information. A simplest example is that
of maps. Different types of information are more easily extracted from
highway maps than from landsat maps. We know which to choose if
our goal is to drive our automobile through the terrain.
End Note
Having gone through a roller-coaster ride of the formats and issues of
image representation, we are now ready to discuss the specific repre-
sentation implemented. This is done in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Methodology
Coding Content
In this chapter, we will discuss the implementation of the content-based
representation of image sequences done in concert with this paper. The
content encoded is image segmentations that spatially correspond to
cognitive objects. This content is encoded not in a separate alpha-
channel,' but, rather, implicitly within the representation; the content
is embedded within the look-up-table.
The representation, specifically the look-up-table, is ordered based
on this content: the representation is content-based.
Coding Context
In dealing with image sequences, we realize that the juxtaposition of
images strongly affect their reading. Context makes content; the two
ired, green and blue channels represent their corresponding color components of
an image; and alpha-channel is, generally, a fourth "channel" for other secondary
information.
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are inextricably interwoven. This is an especially pertinent issue in
encoding digital image sequences, because here we are presented with
the possibility of trancending the traditional linear ordering. Any image
can be connected with any other.
We will code context, implementing it as links between images.
3.1 Why code content implicitly?
3.1.1 Why code content?
How do we re-present information given to us?
Given a certain amount of information, we make certain deductions
to uncover what is of interest to us. We filter, select, and order this
information to gain some understanding. These deductions can be any-
thing from revealing insights to a simple re-ordering of data. From these
deductions, knowledge accumulates. The contents of the information
are these deductions.
In representing this information, it is the aforesaid deductions and
their results that one would like to preserve, to record, to represent; it
is the derived knowledge that we wish to code.
In re-presenting, it is ultimately the content we wish to convey.
Thus, in representation of information, we want to code content.
3.1.2 Why code implicitly?
One common method of coding secondary information is to do so in
a separate alpha channel. This coding would be explicit rather than
implicit, in the sense that the information is contained outside and
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beside the image representation.
We have chosen an implicit method instead. The content that is
being encoded is of central importance and should likewise be treated as
the very core of representation. We then want representations which are
based on content: representations that have content implicitly coded
in them.
Implicit representations are like poetry-words living in themselves,
while alpha-channel explicit representations are like annotated transla-
tions of poetry from a different language-parasitic and incomplete.
Implicit representations are intuitively, conceptually stronger, more
powerful and extensible.
There are certain advantages of implicit coding, including less over-
head in decoding (as we shall see) and simpler file management (since
they are identical with or without segmentation information being en-
coded). But the major reason for its choice is aesthetic: its simplicity
and transparency gives it more elegance. Furthermore, it is in the di-
rection of the, ultimately, model representation as we discuss in the
next section.
3.2 The Model Representation
An image sequence is, at present, a sequence of frames, each of which is
a mass of relatively unstructured pixels. An ideal representation would
be one which is highly structured based on cognition, so that we may
computationally extract what seems trivial to the human eye. What
are the guidelines we should use to move towards our presently unstruc-
tured representation to one which is ideal? What are the limitations?
A model of such an ideal representation is imagery which is com-
pletely synthesized. Computer graphics is ideal. Computer graphics
is a reflection of our cognition. How do we begin to transform image
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sequences toward descriptions of this sort?
We can begin by structuring frames. It is not difficult to com-
putationally delimit a shot as a visually contiguous set of frames. The
process is analogous for delimiting a long sequence into scenes and acts.
Shots belong to scenes which in turn belong to acts. An hierarchical
structure emerges. By treating shots, scenes and acts as scenic units,
frames then become defunct. Frames are replaced by the duration of
these scenic units.
Within a shot, are characters such as a dog or tree, and these char-
acters, more often than not, populate other shots as well. These char-
acters are object units. To correlate to computer graphics, the object
units would be object descriptions while scenic units would be motion
descriptions.
As much as objects in computer graphics are often composed of
different sub-units, so too can characters be broken down into compo-
nents. Conceptually, each pixel is eventually the smallest component.
As with the synthesizing of computer graphics, each pixel is part of a
character and its appearance is influenced by factors such as lighting
and occlusion of other characters. With many frames as data, some of
this information can, hypothetically, be deduced.
3.2.1 Limitations of Implementations
What are the limitations that keep us from the model representation?
In designing a representation, there is a set of tradeoffs between
varying constraints and desires, having to realize the discrepancy be-
tween the ideal and the obtainable.
The desired representation, as mentioned, would be one that con-
tains and incorporates innumerable cognitive principles. In represent-
ing an image, one constraint is that we aim for the retention of a for-
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mat supplying a visual impression to the reader or, failing that, triv-
ial conversion into such a format (computer graphics descriptions are
an example). Yet another constraint involves the problem of cogni-
tive knowledge and the difficulty of its formulation. As Ken Haase
[Haase 90] describes
"we must make certain that we neither separate objects
which should be treated identically nor conflate objects which
should be treated distinctly ... Consider representing a his-
torical figure like Napolean; we could represent him by a
single object, by a set of objects indicating Napolean at
different periods of his life, by a set of roles (as general,
as emperor, as revolutionary, as cultural hero) that he has
variously filled, by different viewpoints on him by different
authors ... we implicitly make important decisions about
which differences matter and which do not. But there are
no universal rules for determining this, but only rules which
depend on individual goals ... ".
The problems of knowledge representation are ultimately central in
the study of content-based representation of digital image sequences.
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3.3 Modus Operandi
For the purpose of demonstration 2 and for simplicity, the representation
we implemented is a variation of the most traditional digital image
representation, the pulse coded modulation(rectangular intensity array
of pixels) representation, with the addition of encoding content. The
content is image segmentation: image areas that correspond to cognitive
objects.
To begin to encode segmentation, we need, first of all, to decide what
constitutes an object in an image-what is a segmentation. It is not
our concern here to compute automatic segmentation; these concerns
belong to the field of image analysis and vision. Our aim is to encode
ready-made segmentations. We will manually create our segmentations.
Automatic or manual, the delimitation of an image segmentation rests
upon a resemblance of sorts between its constituent pixels. Resem-
blances between pixels such as adjacency, color, movement and gradient
suggest that certain pixels belong to one cognitive object. Here, we will
discuss only those guiding resemblances used in our implementation.
The idea of resemblances as a guide for classification and the for-
mulation of knowledge is not novel. In fact, it was the central episteme
in sixteenth century Europe, and by some coincidence there are large
similarities between their veins of approach and the techniques pur-
sued in our implementation. We choose then to discuss our techniques
in parallel with facets of this episteme. There are no claims that this
manner is of any significance, but formatting discussions within such
confines might enable examination of subtleties otherwise unseen.
2just say no!
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3.3.1 Resemblances
Up to the end of sixteenth century, resemblance played a decidedly
constructive role in Western knowledge, to the extent that not only
was it the tool for representing knowledge, but it also made possible
the knowledge of things concrete and abstract. Foucault[Foucault 74]
notes:
Resemblance made possible knowledge of things visible and
invisible and controlled the art of representing them. The
universe was folded upon itself: the earth echoing the sky,
faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants
holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to
man.
The four similitudes are:
* Convenientia-Resemblance by adjacency.
" Aemulatio-Reflection at a distance.
" Analogy-Convenientia merged with Aemulatio.
* Sympathy-Free State Linking of knowledge.
Each of these similitudes parallels the techniques used in our im-
age sequence representation. Convenientia and Aemulatio are used for
image segmentation through spatial and color coherence respectively.
Analogy conceptually echoes the deduction that near-similar segmen-
tations of single frames are really just one cognitive entity that lives
across frames. Finally sympathy echoes the links between image se-
quences. The rest of this chapter discusses each of these items.
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3.4 Convenientia
Convenientia denotes adjacency-a resemblance of place.
Sixteenth century thinkers considered adjacency as only a sign and
visible effect of the real hidden and stronger relationship. It is no
accident that things are adjacent; there is a good plan for it. Nature
placed things next to one another because these things have a deeper
of level of similarity. Thus it is no accident that one part of a finger is
adjacent to another part of a finger, and that one finger is adjacent to
yet another.
Convenientia is the first principle for ordering of the visible.
3.4.1 Spatial Masking for Segmentation Synthe-
sis
Adjacencies offer cognitive guidance in identifying objects in Nature,
and this is no different in the image array.
We will use spatial coherence as a guide to manually create seg-
mentation. We segment an image spatially into parts that roughly
correspond to cognitive objects. One part may correspond to a dog,
another part a tree, and the third the background. This is segmentating
with spatial cues.
This is a very simple procedure. A paint program is used to man-
ually synthesise the segmentation by painting spatial areas for each
cognitive object. A 1-bit mask would be able to denote 2 segmen-
tations (background and foreground). A n-bit mask can denote 2"
segmentations.
This reordering of the image into spatial areas must now be encoded
into the description of the image. In fact, these spatial areas (the
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content) must be used as the basis of the representation of the image.
3.4.2 Encoding
We will demonstrate how to encode an 8bpp image A with 2 segmen-
tations written in the bit-plane M.
The explicit method would be to simply have the bit-plane M as
the alpha channel. This would need an extra bit per pixel bandwidth,
which is a large amount considering some image compression techniques
can compress 8bpp images down to 0.2bpp.
Our implicit method will require no extra bandwidth and will cause
only the most minimal image degradation. We will encode the segmen-
tation within the look-up-table.
Look-Up-Table Concatenation
The technique is called look-up-table concatenation.
The general idea is that we wish to rearrange the image such that
each segmentation of the image reference only one contiguous section
of the look-up-table. The algorithm below and figure 3.1 demonstrate
how this is achieved.
1. Use stencil to produce 'background' and 'foreground' images, A1
and A2. For each pixel p,
if M(p) = 1, then AI(p) = A(p), else Ai(p) = 0
if M(p) = 0, then A 2 (p) = A(p), else A 2 (p) = 0
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2. Compress3 both look-up-tables linearly (or some fancier compres-
sion method) such that
length(lut(A1)) + length(lut(A2)) < 256
3. recombine A1 and A2 by collaging to produce reconstructed image
R, offsetting one pixel values of the second segmentation by the
length of look-up-table of the first.For each pixel p
if A1(p) : 0, then R(p) = A1(p)
else R(p) = A 2 (p) + length(lut(A1)
4. concatenate lut(A1) and lut(A 2) producing lut(R)
5. annotate in the header of resultant image R, with offset which
is equal to length(lut(A1))
3.4.3 Decoding
The decoding could not possibly be simpler. The typical situation is
that we point to a particular pixel in image R, and ask which segmen-
tation it belongs to.
Here is the algorithm used.
1. read once, in the header of R, the offset
2. given pixel p,
if R(p) < offset then it belongs to segmentation 1,
else it belongs to segmentation 2.
38 bpp images cannot refer to entries larger than 256.
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I"age
Figure 3.1: lut-up-table concatenation to encode convenientia segmen-
tation
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
3.5 Aemulatio
Aemulatio denotes similarities between items at a distance.
Freed from the bounds of adjacencies, aemulatio is a form of conve-
nientia, broken from the grips of spatial laws to function at a distance.
It is similitude transcending space, amounting to reflections and con-
versations between these 'disjoint' objects, entirely without motion.
Something else in the commonality between disparate (distanced) ob-
jects that communicates communality. It is really convenientia on a
different dimension-on a non-spatial dimension-as though it is their
references that are in adjacency. In this sense, Aemulatio is a second-
order ordering of the visible.
The human face, from afar, emulates the sky, and just as
man's intellect is an imperfect reflection of God's wisdom,
so his two eyes, with their limited brightness, are a reflection
of the vast illumination spread across the sky by sun and
moon; the mouth is Venus, since it gives passage to kisses
and words of love; the nose provides an image in miniature
of Jove's sceptre and Mercury's staff.[U.Aldrovandi, Mon-
strorum historia, (Bononiae, 1647 p.3)]
3.5.1 Colormap Masking for Segmentation Syn-
thesis
Similarities between pixels need not derive from spatial adjacency, but
could arise from adjacency in intensity, in local gradients, in hue, in
texture etc. In the case of hue-similarity, the pixels reference adjacent
entries in the look-up-table: it is an aemulatio. This similarity can
guide extraction of cognitive objects from the image array. Many cog-
nitive objects do encompass only a limited range of hue-a red shoe,
for example, or even skin tones, and thus we can use hue for classi-
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Figure 3.2: Original image displayed with its colormap.
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fication and perform image segmentations. In fact, there are certain
types of segmentations that are more conveniently created using this
method than the previous one. An example is a flock of birds, where
the segmentation is not spatially localized.
We synthesize a segmentation by tagging the entries of the colormap 4
that are referenced by a cognitive object. We create a colormap "mask"
for 2 segmentations, using this algorithm. We begin with the original
colormap M, a temporary copy C, and end up with a list of tagged
entries L.
1. Make a copy of colormap M, calling it C.
2. Use mouse to pick a pixel on the part of image that is within the
desired segmentation. Note pixel value.
3. For the purpose of a visual check: change corresponding entry
in colormap C to highlighted; loading this colormap will display
all pixels referencing, highlighted. If 'wrong' pixel was picked,
resulting in wrong pixels being highlighted, undo this step and
goto Step 2.
4. Add entry to a list of tagged color-map entries L.
5. Repeat from Step 2 until satisfied.
3.5.2 Encoding
We need now to encode the segmentation in our representation. Since
the segmentation information is completely contained in knowing the
the tagged entries L, all we need to do to encode the segmentation is to
create a new colormap R that groups together the tagged entries. This
is a simple rearranging/reordering of M, by having all tagged entries
in the first section of R, and the rest in the second section.
4A colormap is a look-up-table of colors referenced.
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Figure 3.3: Image Segmentation displayed with tagged colormap.
....................... ..    . ............. ......
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1. Copy first, all tagged entries L into a new colormap R.
2. Concatenate all other entries of M into R.
Rearranging the colormap requires corresponding adjustments in
the pixel array. Since an entry has moved its position in the table, all
pixels referencing this entry have to reference this new position.
1. If pixel value is greater than first entry in list of tagged L, incre-
ment pixel value by one.
2. If pixel value is greater than next entry in list of tagged L, incre-
ment pixel value by one.
3. Repeat from Step 2 until pixel value is smaller than value of next
entry in list of tagged L.
4. Repeat from Step 1 for all pixels in image array.
In this case of encoding 2 segmentations, there is absolutely no extra
bandwidth needed, nor is there any information lost. A simple reorder-
ing incorporates this new information, without sacrifice of anaything.
We have gotten something from nothing!
For more than 2 Segmentations
In the case of encoding more than 2 segmentations in the image array
and colormap, we encounter the problem where more than one seg-
mentation might lay claim to a colormap entry. And because distinct
sections of the colormap represent distinct segmentation, we must, in
the case of the foresaid situation, have that particular entry in both
sections: we have to replicate entries.
Surely there is no problem with replication. Except for one: we are
limited, in images of 8 bits/pixel, that there is a ceiling of 256(= 28)
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Figure 3.4: Rearranged colormap with two segmentation. The numbers
in the final image is changed to reference the correct entries, but the
image is visually identical with the original.
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entries in the colormap. Thus a consequence is that each time we add
an extra segmentation(with its accompanying extra entries), we need
to squeeze the colormap so as to keep the total number of entries within
the allowed limit.
Another simpler method is to begin with a virgin image that has
a compressed colormap of an arbitrary 150 entries. Each time, a new
segmentation is added, extra entries are concatenated, and when it
reaches the maximum allowable number, no more segmentations are
allowed.
We see that, in encoding more than two segmentations, no extra
bandwidth is required but a small amount of hue resolution is sacrificed.
3.5.3 Decoding
In the general schema of incorporating knowledge in descriptions, or-
der is increased. There was an intent of ordering according to certain
principles, and the results of the scheme reflect this process of ordering.
Ease of reading is enhanced because of this ordering.
Bateson[Bateson 72] writes:
Order is seen as a matter of sorting and dividing. But the
essential notion in all sorting is that some difference shall
cause some other difference at a later time. If we are sorting
black balls from white balls, or large balls from small balls,
a difference among the balls is to be followed by a difference
in their location-balls of one class to one sack and balls of
another class to another. ... [a perceiving Entity must be]
invoked to perform this function of creating an otherwise
improbable order.
This reordering of data based on content makes the extraction of
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this content computationally very easy. Here, the decoding is identical
to the one done for the convenientia technique.
3.5.4 Implicit Constraints
As much as implicit coding has its merits, there are associated prob-
lems, some of which are actually absent in explicit methods. Since the
content is embedded into the ordering of the image, any processing that
manipulates and disturbs this ordering would in effect eliminate what
is stored. For example, the segmentation information would be lost as
simple process as a low-pass filtering.
However we must contend that this problem is only indirectly due
to implicit coding, but a problem that arises from the nature of col-
ormaps. Except for grayscale colormaps, filtering on 8bpp images does
not generally work. Filtering works only when the values of the image
array are proportionl to image intensity, and this is the case for 24bpp
or 8bpp grayscale images. The fact that we have decided to encode seg-
mentation information into non-grayscale 8bpp'colormaps, constraints
us the the limitations of the latter.
Thus before choosing where to embed our information, we should
know for what eventual purpose the image is. We put our carrots either
in the ground or in the rabbit's cage depending on what we want the
carrot to do.
3.5.5 Texture Resemblance as Segmentation Syn-
thesis
Let us now embed our information in the look-up-table of vector quan-
tization [Gray 84] instead of a colormap. We choose this because we
know that we would like to eventually compress the image, and vector
quantization allows us just that.
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The aemulatio resemblance in this case is of texture. We start with
a, say, 300 x 400 pixels 8pp color quantized image A. Our algorithm is
as follows:
1. Divide the image A into 2 x 2 blocks to form a quarter sized array
V0.
2. Make a histogram of the (2 x 2)-dimensional vectors of array V0.
There should less than the maximum 3020x2 vectors.
3. Guided by the histogram, select the best representative 1000 vec-
tors. These vectors form the codebook, Bo.
4. Run through V and replace the each vector with the best ap-
proximate vector from the codebook B0 .
5. Now we are ready to embed segmentation information. Recon-
struct vector-quantized image R0 , and display. Click on parts of
image of intended segmentation. For each click, find correspond-
ing entry in Vo, and this entry's entry in B0 . Tag those entries of
Bo.
6. Rearrange B0 to create B, by grouping all tagged entries to the
top of the codebook.
7. Recode V to form V, so that they point to the correct entry of
the rearranged codebook B,.
8. Reconstruct vector-quantized segmentation embedded image V,
which should look visually identical to V0 .
The decoding is similar with that of aemulatio hue-resemblance
image.
As noted in the last subsection about constraints, this image,
embedded with segmentation information, can do all that could
have been done to vector-quantized images.
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Figure 3.5: Embedding segmentation information in vector-quantized
image. The images are (top) a schematic referencing of image, and (bot-
tom) an image with segmentation produced by textural resemblance.
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3.5.6 Application: Segmentation-based Res-
olution
It is often desirable for a certain part of a moving sequence to
be rendered in more detail. When a dog is barking up a tree,
we might want only to look at the tree and ignore that silly dog.
When a cow jumps over the moon, we might want to stare at the
patterned flying cow - there is not much about the moon we can
describe anyway.
It is often true that the transmission channel for images is narrow.
We cannot pipe through everything that we want. But what do
we really want to pipe through anyway? Perhaps all of tree and
just a little of mad dog.
3.6. ANALOGY
3.6 Analogy
Analogy is convenientia and aemulatio superimposed.
We have seen how convenientia and aemulatio have been guiding
rules in synthesizing image segmentations within the still frame.
Convenientia is a first-order spatial adjacency, while aemulatio
is a second-order adjacency in the sense that the referenced was
adjacent. Analogy will help us transcend the frame.
In an analogy, the adjacency is more global. An analogy between
two things is a resemblance in structure, a resemblance in re-
lations. For example, there is an analogy between the human
skeleton and that of birds:
the pinion called the appendix which is in proportion
to the wing and in the same place as the thumb on
the hand; the extremity of the pinion which is like the
fingers in us ... ; the bone given as legs to the bird
corresponding to our heel; just as we have four toes on
our feet, so the birds have four fingers of which the one
behind is proportionate to the big toe in us. [P.Belon,
Histoire de la nautre des oiseaux. Paris 1555 p.37]
There is a convenientia resemblance of one point in the human
skeleton and a corresponding point in the bird's skeleton. There
is also an aemulatio resemblance in the structure of the two skele-
tons.
3.6.1 Analogies-derived Units
Through convenientia and aemulatio, we have created image seg-
mentations for a still frame. On successive frames, we will also
likely obtain similar segmentations. With a dog in one frame and
a dog in the next frame slightly displaced, we make a correlation
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and claim they are not to be two objects, but one and the same.5
Encouraged by a convenientia in time(frames) we make an anal-
ogy between the dogs in adjacent frames. There is but one dog
and it is unleashed from the bounds of the frame. We call the
dog, this entity that lives across frames, a character.
The frame is superceded in this representation.
These analogies can be taken on further, producing analogies on
a higher order. By viewing the imagery and further relations
and groupings of events and objects, parts of the aforementioned
model representation can be attained.
3.7 Sympathies
The final resemblance is sympathy, a similitude that is formed
without any set prior rules prescribed. Sympathy "plays through
the depths of the universe in a free state" [Foucault 74]. It could
be formed through a simple contact as 'mourning roses that have
been used at obsequies' which, simply from their former adja-
cency with death, will render all persons who smell them 'sad and
moribund'. [G.Porta, Magie naturelle (Rouen 1650 p.72)]. But
sympathy is not restricted to any form. "No path has been de-
termined in advance, no distance laid down, no links prescribed."
And it is perhaps of this free form that elevates this instance
of the Same to such a strong and insistent level-it allows the
reader of the Universe to prescribe links with minimal effort, to
allow him to assimilate and integrate his knowledge.
3.7.1 Associations and Links
We code context as links between associated images. These links
are sympathy similitudes.
5 Much has been written about identity and spatio-temporal
continuity[Higgins 67].
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Montage, in linear films, has been the primary method in pre-
scribing links between image sequences to create specific readings.
Eisenstein has studied, with great scrutiny, the effects and fun-
damentals of editing, demonstrating it, with spectacular insight,
in the film Potemkin.
Laser discs offered film-makers a broader set of options upon
which sequences are presented. No longer was it necessary to limit
oneself to linear screening-there was the added ability to pro-
duce movies with multiple (possibly intertwining, repeated etc.)
paths, and the choice of journeys could be chosen dynamically by
the viewer by interaction, or set statically by the maker. In the
Interactive Cinema (ic) Group in the Media Lab at M.I.T., work
has been done to enable the user himself, using presented tools, to
create his own paths while he explores the material, affecting its
subsequent readings[Davenport 89]. These paths are laid based
on sympathies one expresses.
While the links[Davenport 89, Drexler 87] in analog laser discs
done at the ic Group is a frame-to-frame link, the links here of
digital movies are more general. First of all, an advantage to dig-
ital movies is that we need not be limited to accessing particular
frames, but may access items within the frame-the characters,
the individual pixel etc. The default link implemented in our
program links a character with some other entity-a data-base, a
visual effect, or another movie sequence. Tools have been imple-
mented to allow the reader of the movie to create links.
3.8 Signatures
How does the reader know that certain content has been encoded?
Knowledge, as it is being extracted from experiences and dis-
coveries, and re-encoded back into our descriptions of the world,
would be left unread and unnoticed, and thus unutilized, if we
were not to make a mark that it be recognized. As we develop our
understanding of the world around us, so then are our libraries
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filled with manuscripts. These manuscripts are descriptions of
the world, serving as signposts of our journeys, and enables us,
as readers, to re-read what has been coded.
We might make our way through all this marvelous
teeming abundance of resemblances without even sus-
pecting that it has long been prepared by the order of
the world. In order that we may know that aconite
will cure our eye disease, or that ground walnut mixed
with spirits of wind will ease a headache, there must
of course some mark that will make us aware of these
things... Would we ever know that there is a relation
of twinship or rivalry between a man and his planet, if
there were no sign upon his body or among the wrin-
kles of his face that he is an emulator of Mars or akin
to Saturn? [Foucault 74]
We need to label the contents, and allow the reader to read these
labels if he needs to.
3.8.1 Names as Signposts for Knowing
In encoding segmentations implicitly into digital images, the prob-
lem arises whereby there are no visible signs to indicate what has
been encoded. Whether or not a dog has been encoded in the im-
age is not known by the human reader. Names to each segmenta-
tion, acting as signposts of knowing, must be hidden someplace,
and we do it here in image descriptor files that can be readily
read.
It is not God's will that what he creates for man's bene-
fit and what he has given us should remain hidden... And
even though he has hidden certain things, he has al-
lowed nothing to remain without exterior and visible
signs in the form of special marks-just as a man who
has buried a hoard of treasure marks the spot that he
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may find it again. [ Paracelsus, Die 9 Bucher der Natura
Rerum(Works, ed. Suhdorff, vol.IX, p.393)]
In the work done in the ic group, MICONs(motion icons) are pre-
sented to signify to the reader the presence of encoded knowledge.
A MICON tells the reader that the machinery has delimited and
knows of a particular object or sequence, prompting him to se-
lect them if it is his will to do so. This is effective and visually
appealing. An odd aspect of MICONs lies in the fact that they
are often but miniatures of what they identify. To select a visual
object on the screen, one must click, rather than on the object
directly on an icon that signifies it.
The advantage of our digital counterpart is, because we can access
intra-frame units, we no longer need MICONs. We interact directly
with the image itself.
End note
Thus we have encoded content and context within the image rep-
resentation.
We have written the image, and in the next chapter focus on the
issues of reading.
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Chapter 4
The interactive movie
The last three chapters focused on representations-how images are
described and written. In this chapter, we turn our attention to how
these represented images are subsequently read. This is most important
since, ultimately, images are represented to be read. In fact, it was
precisely because of concerns about the eventual reading that motivated
the choice for content-based representations.
We will discuss in this chapter, a particular kind of reading-the
reading through and of an interactive movie. Here, the reader interacts
virtually with the writer through the movie. We will examine the na-
ture of reading an interactive movie to discover some of its associated
problems and their sources. We will proceed to formalize an interactive
movie as a text and construct a computational model of the movie, its
reader, and the communication channel. With such a model intact, we
can suggest certain approaches to solve those problems.
CHAPTER 4. THE INTERACTIVE MOVIE
4.1 Of links, scripts and the interactive
movie
Towards the end of the previous chapter of Methodology, we dis-
cussed the implementation of links as context operatives within a content-
based representation of the moving image. Computationally, these links
are simple pointers that may be set, assigned to specific functions and
programmably "activated".
These links can connect otherwise disparate scenes and players of
the representation, to each other, to exterior textual and visual databases,
or to operative functions. These links can specifically be used as jump
cuts while the movie is being played. In such a use, a link functions as
a montage1 link.
A set of links, in this function, is a set of montage points. Such
a set plays and replaces the traditional role of the linear script, but is
more versatile: it allows for a graphlike2 script, plus any programmable
functionalities such as access to databases or triggering of visual pro-
cessing effects. Thus scripts are incorporated within our content-based
movie representation.
These montage links of our script can be either hard-wired or soft-
wired, that is to say, the link either is always active or awaits activation-
remaining dormant, consummated depending on some state. This state
that determine the consummation of a link, the transformation of point-
ers as links into montage links, can be configured to be affected by the
reader. Through this, the reader gains some control of the path the
movie takes. The reader creates an instance of a script. We begin then
to have an interactive movie.
Thus begins a discourse between the reader and the movie machin-
1montage a la Eisenstein: a structured edit that builds meaning through the
metaphoric associations the reader is encouraged to make.2 web-like; with nodes and edges; binary tree is a type of graph.
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ery, which is the writer in virtual presence. This interactivity between
human and machine (the virtual writer) happens through the language
of a movie. We must examine the nature of this interactivity, its impli-
cations, its effects, and its weaknesses.
4.2 Impact of the interactive
The nature of interactivity affects how an image is read.
The layout structure of information and its access in interactive me-
dia differs from that of non-interactive media. In the former, in all its
varying degrees of interactivity-from occasional prompting to contin-
uous control-the reader is guided through the material, and prompted
to search and select material of their interest. This is not so for the
latter.
In general, it is most likely that the impact of interactive media3
(the apparent amount of understood and retained material), is larger
than that of non-interactive media such as linear video. This has been
demonstrated in various applications, from foreign language study discs
to (re)educational discs for professionals.
It has been argued that different media tend to use and could
potentially cultivate different thinking skills[Olson 74], that instruc-
tional media function as activators and potential cultivators of cog-
nitive styles and strengths. Interactive media is a poignant candi-
date in these realms. Although some exploration is being done in this
direction[Gagnon 86], this relation between interactivity4 and learning
methods is still largely unexamined.
3The observations are of analog laser disc interactive movies, but these observa-
tions hold true for digital or analog. For the rest of the chapter there will be no
distinction between them, unless specifically stated.
4Constructivist approaches to knowledge examined by the Epistemology and
Learning Group at the Media Lab works best. Constructivist, learning through
building, encompasses interactivity.
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4.3 Open and Closed Texts
An interactive movie can be considered and studied as a text.5
Eco[Eco 79] distinguishes between two texts, the open and the closed.
An open text is one whose interpretation is restricted and the Model
Reader6 is highly defined and selected. An open text can be read only
by readers with sufficient knowledge. A closed text, on the other hand,
is one where the Model Reader is a general reader. It is a text that is
"frequently interpreted against the background of codes different from
those intended by the author."
We see here parallels between these two types of texts and the two
types of interactive movies made to date. On the one hand, instruc-
tional interactive movies like "How to Brush your Teeth" are open texts
because it allows for little interpretation, and the intentions of different
readers are not divergent. That its intended audience is consciously
selected, these texts generally perform well in their often well-defined
purposes.
General entertainment interactive movies, on the other hand, are
closed texts, for there can be an immoderate range of interpretations
amongst its varied audience. That its intended audience is wide, and
that the goals are less determined, it is then not entirely surprising that
these movies tend to be less successful at their goals. There are many
reasons why such movies fail.
In the rest of the chapter, we will be focussing on movies that are
closed texts, to examine the reasons why they tend to be less than
entertaining.
5 Tezts is a "network of different messages depending on different codes and
working on different levels of signification".6A Model Reader is a model of the possible reader.
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4.4 The role of the reader
How is a movie read in interactive systems?7
The standard communication model constructed by information
theorists is tripartite-the sender, the message and the addressee [Eco 76],
in which the message is decoded in reference to a code that is shared
between sender and addressee. However, this model does not describe
the actual action of the discourse, especially in the case when the ef-
fective message is cooperatively generated by the reader8 , of which the
interactive movie is an example par excellence.
As the reader forays amongst the many paths through abundant
material, he wanders, skims, trips, and occasionally discovers personally
engaging segments, creating in the process the construction of a script
and an accompanying message. The reader searches for material of
interest, for material of relevance. It is, in some senses, a quest for
identification with the material. To some extent, a reader reads to
educate and inform himself of particular issues. To a larger extent,
a reader reads to reinforce his ideas about the particular matters9 , to
buttress it with facts and stylistic eloquence. He identifies with parts
of the material, and in his identification he indulges in knowing that
other readers, in their reading, are exposed to and informed of "him"
(the image of things with which he identifies). He becomes famous.
In reading, the reader searches for himself.
The failure of such a quest results in disinterest and a lack of aban-
don, either because the material is irrelevant, or the structure of pre-
sentation inaccessible.
The reader has to work to mentally transform the original literal
7 From this point, all references will be to movies as closed texts, unless stated
otherwise.
8 reader and addressee used interchangebly.
'True, often in a reading he modifies or even changes his opinions and insights.
CHAPTER 4. THE INTERACTIVE MOVIE
messages to what he finds desirable, or lack of that, what he believes the
writer intends him to understand. Allegorically, this is demonstrated
by Michel Tort, in his book Intelligence Quotient.
What is going to determine the answer to the question is not
the question as such in the form in which it was posed, it is
also the idea that the interrogated subject forms; about the
most appropriate tactic to adopt in function of the concept
he has formed about the expectations of the interrogator.
What happens when a black man watches a soap opera about white
middle-class suburbia? There might be no decoding to form messages
of relevance to him, no possible consistent transformation of the literal
message. When this situation arises, the reading ceases.
4.5 The responsibilities of the writer
The interactive movie as a closed text often is interpreted against a set
of codes different than the one intended because the actual reader is
different from the model reader the writer had in mind. The writer did
not take into account such a situation. It might be acceptable that this
results in aberrant decoding. But worse yet, the movie might become
irrelevant to the reader who in turn ceases to read. The closed text un-
intentionally becomes an open text. The reader becomes dissinterested
and disappointed.
The reader is uninterested-thought he is not aware of the reason for
his lack of interest-because he has been ignored10 by the writer, who
although might have intended the text to be for the general public, had
failed to include this particular reader. It is particularly annoying that
10In the absence of a gender-neutral noun in English, "he" is used to mean she
and he.
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the reader senses, from the type of text, that the writer had intended
to speak to all. The reader feels not only excluded-he is rejected.
This observation is of course true for all media, but is of particular
issue in interactive media, for it is these media which lay its very foun-
dations and claims on the active participation and incorporation of the
reader.
Inspite of the presumptions in interactivity about exchanges be-
tween the two parties across the interface, the reader's input is often
not sufficiently acknowledged or incorporated into the system.
Baudrillard[Baudrillard 83] writes:
The role of the message is no longer information but test-
ing and polling, and finally control, in the sense that all
your answers are already inscribed in the "role", on the an-
ticipated registers of the code. Montage and codification
demand, in effect, that the viewer construe and decode by
observing the same procedure whereby the work was assem-
bled. The reading of the message is then only a perpetual
examination of the code.
Eco[Eco 79]:
They apparently aim at pulling the reader along a predeter-
mined path, carefully displaying their effects so as to arouse
pity or fear, excitement or depression at the due place and at
the right moment. Every step of the "story" elicits just the
expectation that its further course will satisfy. They seem
to be structured according to an inflexible project. Unfor-
tunately, the only one not to have been 'inflexibly' planned
is the reader.
While reading an interactive movie, we must select the material
we are presented with. But then conversely, the readers are selected
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by the writer. In today's software industry, the code is written by a
demographically small range of people, and thus correspondingly the
resultant software is also for a very particular sample of audience."
Following the tradition of cinematography, the socially disenfranchised
are ignored. There is often nothing in the material that is specifically
of interest to minorities, and thus no reason for interaction. Interactive
movies, even in their conscious pretense of reader incorporation, do not
transcend the practices of an segregated society.
The writer, possibly unaware, is often dangerously ethnocentric.
There needs to be some incorporation of the study of sociology, of
sociolinguistics, in the design of interactive systems and interfaces.
The writer has responsibilities.
4.6 Computational design
In this section, we will formulate computational designs that address
and possibly rectify the problems of interactive movies discussed in the
last section. What computational structures and strategies are needed
to guide the programming of the movie machinery so as to produce
interactions with substantial communication between the machinery
and its readers. Given a mass of material, ethnographically-biased or
not, what are the approaches that best incorporate the reader?
4.6.1 Exchanges between graphs
To begin to appreciate the source of some of the problems of the in-
teractive movie, we must formalize the structure of interactivity and
study its components.
1 1It has been shown that, in general, access to high-technology by minorities is
limited.
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Figure 4.1: w-graph and r-graph
An interaction happens through an interface. An interaction hap-
pens between two (or more) parties. In our discussion on interactive
movies, the two parties are the reader and the virtual writer represented
by the movie machinery. The movie itself is the language, the format
of discourse.
The two sides of the interface can be computationally modelled
as two graphs with a communication path between them. One graph
represents the states of the movie machinery, the states of the virtual
writer. The other graph represents the reader. We shall henceforth call
them the w-graph and the r-graph respectively.
In programming of an interactive movie thus far, much attention
is focussed on the w-graph-the structure of actions and reactions of
the computer in the exchange. Little attention has been given to the
modelling of the r-graph-the anthropological study of actions and re-
actions of the reader, and th-e mental transformations necessitated by
the human when presented with reactions, sometimes consistently bi-
ased, from the machine.
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Furthermore the w-graph is written with insufficient attention to
the structure of the r-graph. The machine interacts assuming a model-
reader(in the image of the programmer.) Consequently, the actual
reader, in his real reactions to the machine's actions, will "confuse"
the machine, further contaminating proper exchange, and rendering
discourse futile and insubstantial.
In this interaction, ther is no common grounds between the parties.
There is no grounding in communication. In the next section, we will
examine what the neccessary criteria are that would enable communi-
cation through an interface.
4.7 Grounding in communication
A meaningful communication is established if there is coordination in
content and process, meaning that both parties agree what the sub-
ject is that they are dealing with, and the method and style they em-
ploy, respectively. To be able to establish this, Clark[Clark] writes, in
Grounding in Communication:
They cannot even begin to coordinate on content without
assuming a vast amount of shared information or common
ground- that is, mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs and mu-
tual assumptions. And to coordinate on process, they need
to update, or revise their common ground moment by mo-
ment.
In a sense, we have already touched upon the issue of coordination
of content-we have seen that without interest on the reader's part on
a particular subject, there will be no communication or interactivity.
About the coordination of process, it will only be successful when
the two parties are aware of each other's state, manners, as well as the
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each other's goals. We have modelled the two parties in an interaction
as two graphs. A graph includes representation of a party's character,
beliefs and behavior, or, using other words, the party's states, manners,
and goals. To enable communication, the two parties must be able to
coordinate content(decide together what the semantics are), manipulate
context(how syntax changes meaning). Furthermore, to coordinate in
process also requires each party to have some reasonable assumption of
the nature and form of the other party's graph. Each party has memory
of the other party's past behaviour, and thus can gradually construct
and modify an assumption-graph that models the other party's actual
graph.
We will examine various points in the following subsections.
4.7.1 Coordination of content
Lewis Carroll in Alice in Wonderland:
Alice, when talking to Humpty Dumpty, asked whether a word he
used could mean what he said it meant. Humpty Dumpty: "Who
is to be the master? The Word or I?"
The meaning and effect of an image is a function of cultural pa-
rameters, conventional associations and usage. An image of a tiger
can signify, outside of the representation of the actual striped animal,
strength, integrity or danger.
An interactive movie can use a system where an individual image,
or an image sequence, can be "tagged" to signify an arbitrary set of
things (cognitive objects, associative adjectives, etc.). These tags can,
in the next developmental stage, be used as automatic script guiders.
The script then can be as free-form as "Thunder when the Evil Witch
of the West next meets Oz". This is the beginning of an intelligent
script-reader like the ones implemented for computer graphics in the
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now-defunct Vivarium Group in the Media Lab. The movie runs off on
its own.
An interactive movie should alow the reader to effect content (the
connotations contained) of individual images. The content of an image
is effected simply by supplementing the list of signifiers attached to it.
The reader thus decides the content of image and its associations. It
is the machine and the way it represents images that should offer the
ability to assimilate new information, and, at a later time, present it in
suggestive and pliable fashions when invoked. The machinery listens;
and the dialogue that ensues enriches the language of the images. This
implements what is actually true of the plasticity of images in general-
that the meaning of an image changes with use.
4.7.2 Manipulation of context
The content and meaning of any imagery cannot be dealt with without
considering its context. Context affects content. Different montages
(structure of editing) of the same material produce entirely differently
meanings. Using and arranging specific segments of Star Wars can
make its reading more horrifying than Halloween VI or more romantic
than Aria.
An interactive movie should take advantage of the possibility of
allowing the reader to participate in the actual creation of the movie
itself. He should be presented with tools 12 with which he can then
change the meaning of the movie by adding (or removing) montage
links, and thus transform its accents and moods.13 As in any reasonable
discourse, both parties form the manners of the exchange.
12Tools are software units in the form of user-friendly objects. An example would
be a linker that prompts linking two segments producing a virtual montage point.
13This is computationally feasible, and in fact has been experimentally imple-
mented by the Interactive Cinema Group at the Media Lab. Robin[Robin 90] of
the Visible Language Workshop at the Media Lab has also done related work in
scripting.
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The reader becomes a secondary writer. He modifies the script.
4.7.3 Acknowledgement of intentions
A major cause of miscommunication, between two systems, is wrong
assumptions and beliefs of one system of the other. Dennet [Dennet 79],
in his examination of the interaction between a human and another
complex system, coins the term intentional system as
... a system whose behaviour can be-at least sometimes-
explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the
system of beliefs and desires (and hope, fears, intentions,
hunches,...).
Surely, the virtual writer must be designed in such a manner such
as to treat its reader as such a system. The virtual writer must begin
an interaction by making certain assumptions of its reader's desires,
beliefs and intentions; it must give to its reader, a loan of a set of goals,
desires and beliefs. In designing an interactive system, the system must
assume that the reader has intentions. Most systems however, to avoid
complexities, instead use a design stance in its view of its reader: "if
he clicks on A, I must give him B." This design stance does not work.
For an interaction to be more substantial, the virtual writer must
view the reader as an intentional system. But how do we begin to
represent attributions of beliefs and desires?
4.7.4 Frames of mind
A r-graph, with its nodes and edges, can be used to model a set of
desires, beliefs and goals.
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Figure 4.2: A set of assumptions of the other party is taken by choosing
and modifying a frame from a library.
The two sides of interaction, on the side of the reader and the side of
the computational structure of the machinery, are represented with the
r-graph and the w-graph. For any constructive communication, both
sides must begin to build an image of the other's graph, the other's
"goals, desires and beliefs." But this "building" should not begin from
nought. Instead, given some initial input, a large amount of assump-
tions should be taken which can subsequently be modified. In other
words, from a library of frames (library of graphs and associated data),
one frame should be chosen and adopted as an assumption-graph of the
other party; and as interaction proceeds, these "goals, desires and be-
liefs", represented by this envisioned graph, must be modified to gain
best results. It is a "tree of knowledge" that consistently needs prun-
ing and trimmings as new data arrives. However this frame can be
abandoned for another if, after some interaction, it appears to be an
unsuitable one.
Minsky[Minsky 74] wrote of a good example of a person interacting
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with a new environment. The person walks into a room that has a table
with four chairs around it. He immediately refers to a frame he has in
his mind, and assumes it is a living room. He sees not the entirety of
each chair, for they are visually blocked by the table. But he deduces
what the rest of the chair to be. He has "assembled" a graph that
represents his knowledge. As he walks around the room, he discovers
a cup on the seat of one of the chairs. No panic- he attaches another
node to his graph for it. But if by some insight he realizes that it is
not a living room but a dining room, he must abandon this graph for
a new frame of mind. There are links between associated frames.
4.8 Guidance in dramatic structure
Of course not all disenchantment with interactive movies stem from the
lack of grounding in communication. Given that interactive movie has
but a short history, there are no good models, no good experiences to
draw upon. But there is a rich history of linear narration, and with it
has developed many effective rules of presentation. Are there no lessons
we can learn from them?
An example is dramatic structure-set-up, adventure/conflict and
climax/crisis denouement. The nature of interactivity need not elimi-
nate this. Even with input from the reader, drama can still be guided
with some basic principles. This is being attempted by Joseph Bates
[Bates 90] in his project Computational Drama in Oz.
He writes:
... rapidly search abstract plot space for controllable paths
that have the desired dramatic structure. We can view this
as a kind of abstract adversary search, where we define a
set of abstract operators, means for mapping operators into
concrete moves, means for recognizing the abstract effects
of the users moves, and an evaluation function on event
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histories (ie, stories) that lets us recognize sequences with
"good" dramatic structure.
4.9 Ethnographic design
One major pitfall in interactive movie programming is that it is ethno-
centric. Minorities have traditionally been rejected. It has also been
shown [Spender 80] that women have been consistently ignored in texts.
These and other disenfranchised groups form the majority of readers
and thus it should only be expected that movies will fail if these readers
are not taken as central in designing the nature of the programming.
How can this problem be approached? To start, an analysis of
interfaces and programming can reveal attributes and deficiencies in
ethnographic criteria. From such analyses, guiding principles can be
assembled with which future programming can follow. Each new pro-
gramming can in turn be evaluated and advised according to these
principles.
4.10 Interface Bottleneck
Numerous problems in interaction arise from the limited channel band-
width of the interface. A mouse as an interface gives only the options of
placement in 2-D and whether or not buttons are pressed at any time.
For the machinery to successfully communicate with readers, it must
be able to read them, and that is not possible before a more advanced
interface is developed that offers a larger bandwidth and more flexible
interface channel.
Chapter 5
Currents
In this final chapter, we reiterate and re-examine the goals of
representing imagery, and the motivations and idealism behind
implicit coding and content-based reprsentations.
5.1 Objectivity vs. subjectivity
We pause here for a moment to examine both the views of objec-
tivists and subjectivists about representations.
For the objectivist, things exists independantly of mind, and
events occur whether or not they are observed. His thesis is,
as Bunge[Bunge 74] writes:
A representation, by definition, represents something:
there can be no representation in and by itself... [it]
maps (some of) the features of the [depicted]. A rep-
resentation is not a part, let alone the whole, of its
object... a representation, however creative, does not
create its object. To claim that it does is to muddle
things up and to make it mockery of the age long striv-
ing for objectivity, that supreme accomplishment of the
creative scientist.
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For the subjectivist, on the other hand, there is no physical world
that exists independant of our descriptions. For him, the world
is our representation or part of the latter. Representations are
creations not copies.
Goodman:
There is no such thing as the way the world is: the
world is as many ways as it can be truly described,
seen, picture, etc.[Goodman 60]
That nature imitates art is too timid a dictum. Nature
is a product of art and discourse. [Goodman 68]
In this paper we subscribed to the subjectivist stance, and aban-
doned the historical declared aim for objectivity. We had demon-
strated, in the first chapter on Digital Messages, that the very
format of representation itself is a function of culture; it reflects
the general episteme of the culture.
With this, we accept the futility of the search for objective repre-
sentations and surrender attempts to describe the world "the way
the world is"), We begin to then describe the world, in images
and otherwise, in "as many ways as it can be truly described".
We may then describe the world and images as we see it. De-
scriptions are interpretations and we accept the impossibility of
hermeneutical neutrality.
What an image contains depends squarely on "the way we see
it". That the content, is central to the issue of representation,
suggested that representations should be constructed upon them.
This is the motivation for our search for content-based represen-
tations.
5.2. THE IDENTITY OF THE IMAGE
5.2 The identity of the image
5.2.1 Aesthetics of the image
One of the goals of an artist, in the act of rendering, is to tran-
scend the physical canvas, to endow the rendering with "con-
sciousness," to inject it with spirituality. Allegorically, the image
then speaks.
If we were to have this be an aesthetic goal in digital representa-
tions of imagery, we must begin to examine procedures that might
lead to it. How can a digital image begin to have "sense"? Surely,
one of the prerequisites is that an image knows about itself-
it knows what it contains, and its constituents know what they
constitute, as much as DNA molecules know about the organism
it builds. Holography too achieves this quality: every piece of a
hologram contains the entire image. Illuminating just one sec-
tion still "works", though less vibrantly. What fate belies the
plane-image?
5.2.2 Modeling the image
How can we achieve such aesthecism for the registered plane-
image? How can pixels be injected with soul, and transcend the
being of a artifact?
If it is not possible that each pixel be a microcosm of the image,
then at least each pixel can be made to connect to all others
at various levels. Each pixel must be aware of its neighbors,
each pixel must have the knowledge, or at least the access to this
knowledge, of what larger units it constitutes. If it is not possible
that each pixel contains all of the image, then we will have to be
contented with the image as a constructed heterarchical structure
of relationships. At least then each pixel can know the entire
image 'through' other pixels.
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A model representation of the registered plane-image then, as ar-
gued in Methodology, is computer graphics descriptions. These
synthetic descriptions that begin with description of objects as
identities, are based upon and reflect cognitive perceptions. In
these descriptions, each pixel "knows" very well about the image
and how it is constructed, for the pixel is actually the manifesta-
tion of the descriptions.
Computer graphics offer valuable guides to a cognitively struc-
tured description of registered image sequences.
5.2.3 Analysis vs. synthesis
One of the driving forces behind computer graphics is the attain-
ment of realism-to imitate and simulate reality by constructing
an image from symbolic descriptions of entities. A virtual uni-
verse is simulated[Baudrillard 83] through exact descriptions.
On the other end of the spectrum, our desired representation of
registered imagery is to process and analyse according to cognitive
principles, so that we can describe them synthetically.
Analysis and synthesis is merging, or at least their goals ap-
pear to be so. There is no longer any conceptual difference be-
tween the descriptions of computer graphics and registered im-
agery. Watlington's Video Finger is a clear example of this merge.
It is in this direction that further developments of implicitly coded
content-based representations should head.
5.3 The Knowledge of the Image
5.3.1 Tags, links, and information
The model computer graphics description for registered image se-
quence gives us some guidance of what we wish to achieve.
5.3. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMAGE
We are not at the point to achieve an implementation with sub-
stantial structural similarities, but certain desirable qualities can
be achieved. The implementation in the chapter of Method-
ology incorporates some of them. Analogies formed characters
that represent cognitive objects, and ordered sets of contiguous
frames into shots. Sympathies set sequences into context with
links. Short of achieving the ideal, the representation inherits a
mishmash of encoded information, tags and links. It needs major
study before the form of the model representation can be echoed.
Is this mishmash of encoded information worthwhile?
It is likely that the information embedded in images, and the
links between them might be inconsequential and irrelevant. It
is then likely that the entire endeavour might be discounted as
fanciful and foolish. Our aim was to encode meaningful knowl-
edge into images, to "inject the image with soul", and we end
up with a possible clutter. Is the entire concept of content-based
representation unrealizable?
5.3.2 Knowledge vs. information
If the image does not have knowledge, at least it has information.
In a keynote address to the 37th Annual Conference of the Cana-
dian Library Association, Heinz Von Foerster speaks of books in
libraries as sources of information that is crucial for research, he
highlights the often vague distinctions between information and
knowledge. Foerster speaks:
... The perversion of the notion of knowledge, and the
related misconception of the social function of the li-
brary and its librarians is connected to a confusion that
presents the library as a repository of knowledge and
information. However, a library cannot store knowl-
edge and information-only documents, books, maps,
microfiche, slides, etc. When people use these materials
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they will become knowledgeable and informed. By ob-
fuscating this distinction, knowledge and information
can be made to appear as if they were commodities,
to wit, the emerging "knowledge industry", "informa-
tion processors," etc. With this the problems of how to
know and how to let know are successfully pushed into
a cognitive blind spot.[Foerster 821
5.3.3 Knowledge through information
Knowledge is naturally the desired, the end, but without infor-
mation there can be no such end. Only with a sufficiently large
bank of information can there be deductions, excavations of rela-
tionships, coherent understanding manifested by hypothesis and
thesis. Of course, although information is necessary, this same
information must be organized in an accessible fashion, ordered
in a manner that encourages examination. Foerster:
... I do not perceive a library as a bonum librorium
copia, or a collection of good books, and the librarian
as the custodian for these books. No! I see in a library
the most awesome manifestation of the traces of our
civilization and the librarian, in the role of a midwife
or an obstetrician, helping people giving birth to new
ideas, understanding and insights.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In our idealism of content-based reprentation, the intent was to
embed an image with knowledge. We have instead an image em-
bedded with information. The distinction between knowledge and
information is connected with the definition of content. We shall
leave it at that, and persist with our contentions and take solace
in claiming the fact that the image's new properties do make the
the image richer.
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Glossary
registered image An image recorded of the natural world with a tak-
ing instrument such a camera.
analogon An image array as an object.
first message Pure denotation of the depicted scene.
look-up-table List of referenced items, such as colors, of an image.
content A cognitive entity in an image.
context Relative placement of, and relationships between chunks of
information.
plane-image A flat surface format of an image such as a photograph.
colormap A look-up-table for colors in an image.
vector quantization Method to find best limited set of representative
vectors.
link A symbolic connection between two image sequences.
image segmentation A spatial section of an image.
character An entity derived from analogous segmentations across suc-
cessive frames.
shot A visually contiguous sequence of image frames.
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episteme Paradigm through which knowledge is gathered.
implicit coding Coding of information within representation.
explicit coding Coding of information alongside representation, such
as the use of an alpha-channel.
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